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Abstract 
Using the data collected by Itanes on a sample of the Italian population, representative 
according to the main socio-demographic variables, we analyzed the relations between 
voting intention, explicit and implicit political attitudes, and voting behavior. Participants (N 
= 1,377) were interviewed twice, both before and after the 2006 Italian National Election. 
The implicit attitudes (measured using the IAT) were substantially as effective as voting 
intention, and more effective than the explicit attitudes towards the main Italian political 
leaders, in forecasting the Election official results. When used to predict participants’ voting 
behavior, the IAT added a significant, although slight, power to voting intention and explicit 
attitude. Inconsistency between explicit and implicit attitudes exerted a negative influence on 
the probability of having decided one’s voting behavior in the pre-electoral poll; however, 
among undecided participants, it did not significantly influence the probability of delaying 
one’s voting decision and that of actually casting a valid vote. Limits and possible 
developments of this research are discussed. 
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“Have I missed the mark, or, like true archer, do I strike 
my quarry? Or am I prophet of lies, a babbler from door 
to door?” (Cassandra. Aeschylus, Agamemnon) 
 
The art of divination has always fascinated humanity, but it rarely heralds honor and 
glory. Greek mythology condemned Cassandra to utter true prophecies and go unheeded. 
Nowadays, electoral pollsters do not often have a much better fate: Indeed, they are paid 
much more attention than poor Cassandra was, but the possibility of foretelling the future in 
such an accurate way seems to be denied them. For example, in the 2006 Italian National 
Election a few weeks before the vote most research institutes predicted that the left-wing 
coalition would have won the election with an advantage of 4-5%. The left-wing coalition 
did in fact win, but with a much narrower margin (0.1% if computed taking into 
consideration the small parties which did not converge into one of the two coalitions, which 
obtained the 0.3% of the valid votes, and 0.2% if excluding them from the analysis). 
Why are election predictions sometimes wrong? The most used way of predicting 
electoral results is constituted by surveys: A representative sample is extracted from the 
population of potential voters and asked which candidate they would vote for, if the election 
were being held at that time. Results are then generalized to the whole population and 
projected to Election Day. Assuming that a sound sampling method is applied, and the 
survey is conducted relatively near the Election Day, this strategy ought to lead to highly 
accurate predictions. We shall endeavor to explain why often it does not. 
First, some of the interviewees, who could be classified as reticent, refuse to take part 
in opinion polls and to express their voting intention tout court. Then, there are individuals 
who express a clear political preference in the pre-electoral survey, but subsequently behave 
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differently from their stated voting intention. These are the ”volatiles”, or those who prefer to 
give an insincere answer when asked about their voting intention, often because they 
perceive a climate of opinion in the country that is contrary to their position                
(Noelle-Neumann, 1993). Last but not least, there are the “undecided” voters, who describe 
themselves as hypothetically disposed to tell us their voting intention, but maintain that they 
haven’t formed a decision yet. Two different kinds of voters are probably included in this 
category: those who have already developed an electoral choice but conceal it behind a 
curtain of indecision, and those who really are in doubt as to what behavior they should 
enact.  
Pre-electoral surveys do not always indicate clearly the percentage of reticent and 
undecided respondents, at least in Italy, although this is usually far from negligible 
(Gasperoni & Callegaro, 2008). As concerns the 2006 National Election, Sani (2006) showed 
that 13% of Italians made up their mind during the last week before the election, and 9.5% 
did so while in the polling booth. These percentages are considerably higher than the 
difference between the two coalitions indicated by pre-electoral surveys: If unevenly 
distributed between the two coalitions, undecided voters could have even reversed the results 
of the vote! 
How can researchers overcome this problem? A first strategy consists in neglecting the 
presence of undecided and reticent voters, assuming that they will show the same pattern of 
voting behaviors as those who express a clear orientation in the pre-electoral survey. This 
solution may just seem simple but it is in fact too simplistic, because empirical data clearly 
confute the postulate that the behaviors of the two types of electors are the same (see for 
example Durand, Blais, & Larochelle, 2004). A second, and yet unsatisfactory, strategy is to 
allocate undecided respondents evenly between the candidates, under the questionable 
assumption that this proportion of the electorate will vote randomly (Visser, Krosnick, 
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Marquette, & Curtin, 2000). A third possibility is more sophisticated, and consists of 
correcting the forecasts on the basis of the available information on the various segments of 
the electorate to which the undecided and reticent voters belong. However, this strategy is 
unsatisfactory as well. Corrections can indeed be based on voting behaviors in previous 
elections, but important changes may have subsequently occurred in the political or electoral 
framework. Alternatively, corrections can be based on the voting intentions of other 
individuals with similar socio-demographic characteristics to those who did not express their 
voting intention, but these are not conclusive either, because of the risks of overlooking 
aspects which are unknown to the researcher, but relevant for the choice. A fourth possibility 
consists of collecting information during the pre-electoral survey, which will enable 
reconstruction of the cognitive representations and the attitudes of the interviewees regarding 
the political system and the political objects. This information will allow a forecast to be 
made about the voting decision that will be developed or about the decision taken by 
participants, even by people who did not declare it.   
In line with the strategy to improve electoral forecasts through the use of indirect 
indicators of political attitudes and opinions, use of the tools recently developed within the 
social cognitive paradigm may be proposed. They consist of various techniques based on the 
speed and accuracy with which respondents perform simple tasks, enabling inferences on the 
structure of their attitudes to be made (see, inter alia, Fazio & Olson, 2003; Maass, Castelli, 
& Arcuri, 2000; Zogmaister & Castelli, 2006). Among these measures, the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,1998) proved to be a particularly 
sensitive and versatile tool, and was successfully applied in many areas of research, among 
which the measurement of political attitudes (Friese, Bluemke, &  Wänke, 2007; Knutson, 
Wood, Spampinato, & Grafman, 2006; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; see also 
Greenwald & Nosek, 2008). 
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In Italy the association between the IAT and the voting behavior was recently studied 
by Arcuri, Castelli, Galdi, Zogmaister, and Amadori (2008). Four weeks before the 2001 
Italian National Election, Arcuri and colleagues administered the IAT to a sample of voters 
who had clearly sided with one of the opposing parties, in order to measure their implicit 
preference for the leaders of the two political coalitions. After the election, the voting 
behavior of these respondents was registered, and a very high level of coherence emerged 
between their electoral behavior and previously assessed implicit attitudes. In a second study, 
Arcuri and co-workers, before the 2005 Italian local elections, administered the IAT to a 
sample of voters who had not yet formed a voting intention. They found that the IAT index 
of political preference was a good predictor of subsequent voting behavior and for this 
reason they suggested that the IAT could be a useful tool to infer the electoral preferences 
and the implicit attitudes of those describing themselves as “undecided” in pre-electoral 
surveys. 
A further step in the agenda of researchers into implicit aspects in electoral choices 
consists in investigating the interplay between implicit and explicit attitudes in the prediction 
of the voting behavior. It is necessary to take such step both from the applied perspective—in 
order to investigate whether the IAT does actually improve the correctness of voting 
forecasts when used alone and/or together with the direct questions traditionally used by 
opinion pollsters—and from the theoretical perspective, in order to better understand the 
relations between implicit attitudes, explicit attitudes, and electoral behavior. The question 
here is not only whether measures of implicit attitudes provide additional predictive power, 
when used together with measures of explicit attitudes, but also what additional information 
they may provide.  
Models of prediction of political behavior 
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Three main models may be used to predict the association between explicit and 
implicit measures of political attitudes on the one hand, and political behaviors on the other 
hand: the additive, the double-dissociation, and the interaction model (see Perugini, 2005).  
According to the additive model, both the explicit and the implicit measures of 
political preference should contribute to the prediction of voting behavior. Hence, implicit 
measures should add incremental validity to explicit ones and vice versa, and more valid 
electoral forecasts should result when both types of measures are used together. On the 
contrary, the double-dissociation model posits that implicit attitudes uniquely predict 
spontaneous behaviors and explicit attitudes uniquely predict deliberative behaviors; 
therefore, as voting behavior has presumably a strong controlled component, based on such 
model we should expect that, as long as we have a valid and reliable measure of explicit 
attitudes, adding implicit measures to explicit ones should not improve the prediction of the 
content of the voting behavior. Finally, according to the interaction model, the relationship 
between implicit and explicit measures of political attitudes on the one hand, and voting 
behavior on the other hand, should be influenced by the attitudes’ interplay. In particular, 
when they are congruent they should act synergistically and facilitate voting behavior, while 
their incongruence should hinder it. 
In the present study we tested the three models of prediction outlined above in 
relation to two different aspects of electoral behavior: casting a vote as opposed to abstain 
from vote, and choosing the left- vs. the right-wing coalition.  
Goals and hypotheses 
Our research had one general goal, to test the external validity of the IAT with a 
representative sample of the population of voters, face-to-face interviewed. This goal was 
relevant not only from an applicative point of view, particularly for researchers interested in 
voting polls, but also for social and political psychologists themselves, as it concerned the 
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more general question of generalizability of the use of the IAT outside convenience samples.  
We expected the IAT to show a significant relation with our participants’ voting behavior, 
like in Arcuri et al.’s (2008) research. This was the HP1 of our research. 
Besides this general goal, we had two specific goals. First, we aimed at studying if 
using the IAT in a pre-electoral poll could improve the predictive power of electoral 
forecasts. As, based on the literature we could not develop precise hypotheses, we used an 
exploratory approach, comparing the actual results of the 2006 Italian National Election with 
those we could forecast using the IAT, voting intention, and the explicit judgments expressed 
on the Italian main political leaders. The IAT may only be considered as a useful tool for 
election forecasts if it does achieve a better performance, when compared with voting 
intention and explicit political attitudes, in predicting the election outcomes. An accurate 
evaluation of its efficacy is essential because its administration to a large sample of 
respondents is highly expensive and time consuming. Administering it does indeed involve 
face-to-face interviews and it therefore requires a network of interviewers to be trained and 
disseminated throughout the territory. Synchronization of the interactions between 
interviewers and interviewees is also required. Thus, even performing the Brief IAT, recently 
proposed by Sriram & Greenwald (submitted), would result much more expensive than 
assessing the standard explicit variables assessed in pre-electoral polls.1 
Our second goal was to shed some new light on the interplay of implicit and explicit 
psychological processes underlying voting behavior. Recent reseach has indeed shown that 
political decisions can be based on both explicit and implicit attitudes, with an interplay 
between the two (Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski, 2008). Therefore, we specifically tested and 
                                                 
1 It may be argued that a wide sample of participants could be easily contacted through the world-wide-web. 
Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald (2002) did indeed reach a very large sample of American respondents through a 
web-based IAT administration. But empirical evidence clearly emphasizes that distributions of variables 
collected through web-research are systematically distorted, as compared to those emerging from representative 
samples (Schonlau et al., 2004). Even worse, the relationships between variables can be distorted by web 
sampling (Best & Krueger, 2002). Therefore, face-to-face administered IATs seem to be essential for accurate 
forecasts. 
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contrasted the additive, the dissociative, and the interaction model outlined above with 
reference to two distinct aspects of voting behavior: enacting the behavior (i.e., going to the 
ballot vs. abstaining from the vote) and the content of the vote casted. 
The three above-mentioned models may be taken into consideration (Perugini, 2005). If 
voting behavior is mostly based on controlled processes, according to the dissociative model 
only explicit attitudes should predict it. Thus, the IAT shoud add no predictive power to 
models predicting the content of the voting behavior using explicit attitudes (HP2a). If, on 
the contrary, we assume that both controlled and automatic processes influence voting 
behavior, the additive model of prediction should adequately describe the processes leading 
to the electoral choice. According to such model, the IAT should add predictive power to the 
models predicting the content of the voting behavior using explicit attitudes (HP2b). This 
would be expected both if we assume that implicit and explicit measures tap into the same 
unitary attitudinal construct (e.g., Fazio, 2007), and hence the former may capture specific 
parts of true variance in the attitude left unexplained by the latter, and also from the point of 
view a   dual-attitude perspective, according to which social behavior is controlled by two 
different attitudinal systems (e.g., the reflective and the impulsive system, Strack & Deutsch, 
2004; the fast and the slow learning system, Smith & Decoster, 2000; explicit and implicit 
attitudes, Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).  
The third model we took into consideration was the interactive model. We reasoned 
that there is no a priori reason to expect that interactive effects between explicit and implicit 
attitudes influence the content of the casted ballot, and therefore we hypothesized that the 
interactive model would not fit the data, with regard to the prediction of the content of the 
vote. We translated this prediction into the following hypothesis: The interaction between 
our participants’ explicit and implicit political attitudes should not influence their actual 
voting behavior (HP3).  
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However, as concerns the other aspect of voting behavior we took into consideration, 
namely voting versus abstaining from the vote, we expected that congruence between 
explicit and implicit attitudes should exert a synergistic and facilitatory effect on decision 
making. If this is the case, when compared with respondents with incongruent explicit and 
implicit attitudes, those with congruent attitudes should show a higher probability of having 
made up their decision at the moment of the pre-electoral interview, i.e. about one month 
before the Election (HP4). Moreover, for those who have not yet made up their decision at 
the moment of the pre-electoral interview, i.e. for our undecided voters, the synergistic effect 
of congruence between explicit and implicit attitudes should result in (a) higher probability 
to actually cast a ballot (HP5), and (b) a faster decision making (HP6). On the contrary, 
explicit attitudes and—when available—voting intention—should not influence these three 
variables. Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses. 
Method 
As it has traditionally done since the beginning of the 1990s, the Itanes group, to which 
the first author of this article belongs,2 analyzed the voting behavior of Italians in the 2006 
National Election. A panel composed of 1,377 people was interviewed. Participants were 
interviewed face-to face twice, both in Computer-Assisted Personal Interviews. The first 
interview was performed about a month before the election, and the second one was 
performed just after it. At the end of the pre-electoral interview, participants were asked to 
complete the IAT. 
The IAT is a computer administered task, in which respondents perform a series of 
categorization trials. In each trial, a stimulus appears in the center of the screen. In an IAT 
aimed at investigating the preferential attitude toward one of two political coalitions, for 
example, the nouns of the parties belonging to the two opposing coalitions or of their leaders 
                                                 
2 Itanes stands for ITAlian National Election Studies. Readers interested in this research program details should 
visit the website www.itanes.org 
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could be presented together with words with a clear positive or negative valence (e.g., love, 
happiness, hate, sickness). Each time one of these stimuli appears on the monitor, 
participants are requested to classify it by pressing one of two keys, which are situated on the 
right and on the left of the keyboard. Hence, four categories, but only two response keys, are 
presented and each response key must be used for two of the categories. The response has to 
be given as quickly and accurately as possible.  
IAT trials are presented in blocks, and the association between response keys and 
stimulus categories is different in each block. More specifically, two of the blocks of trials 
are critical, whereas the others are administered for practice. In one of the critical blocks, 
participants are requested to press the same key for nouns of parties or leaders belonging to 
the left-wing coalition and words with positive valence. The other key has to be pressed for 
nouns of parties or leaders belonging to the right-wing coalition and words with negative 
valence. In the other critical block, one key is used to categorize parties or leaders belonging 
to the right-wing coalition and positive words, the other for parties or leaders of the left-wing 
coalition and negative words. These critical blocks are preceded by simple categorization 
blocks, to enable the respondent to learn how to react to the stimuli. The whole procedure 
therefore consists in five blocks of trials, in the sequence depicted in Table 2. 
For the respondents who spontaneously prefer the left-wing, as compared to the  
right-wing, coalition, the block of trials which associates left-wing parties or leaders and 
positively valenced words in the answer key should be easier, as compared to the block in 
which the same parties or leaders are associated with negatively valenced words. They 
should therefore be faster and more accurate in the first critical block, as compared to the 
second one. The opposite result is expected from respondents who spontaneously prefer the 
right-wing coalition. As we shall see in greater detail in the description of the results of the 
present research, a differential index can be computed for each respondent, based on speed 
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and accuracy in critical blocks (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). This index is considered 
to be an indicator of the attitude underlying the responses and its predictive validity was 
demonstrated with reference to various kinds of behaviors (see Greenwald, Poehlman, 
Uhlmann, & Banaji, in press). 
A characteristic of the IAT, which is particularly important in relation to the prediction of 
the electoral behaviors of reticent and undecided voters, consists in the fact that the 
respondents are not asked any questions about their political attitudes. The latter are inferred 
on the basis of the speed and accuracy of their performance. Hence, these attitudes may 
emerge even without being expressed with consciousness or intentionality, and therefore the 
IAT seems to be an appropriate instrument for the investigation of the political preferences 
of people who would prefer not to declare they future voting behavior and of those 
describing themselves as undecided in pre-electoral surveys (see Arcuri et al., 2008, for a 
more detailed discussion on the use of the IAT for the investigation of political attitudes).  
We built two IATs, differing in content. The first one, which we labeled “Parties-IAT”, 
was aimed at analyzing our participants’ implicit attitudes toward the main parties of the 
Unione, the left-wing coalition (i.e. Rifondazione Comunista, Democratici di Sinistra, 
Margherita, and Verdi) and of the CdL, the right-wing coalition (i.e. Forza Italia, Alleanza 
nazionale, Lega Nord, and UDC). The second one, which we labeled “Leaders-IAT”, 
analyzed our participants’ implicit attitudes toward the main leaders of the Unione (Romano 
Prodi, Piero Fassino, Francesco Rutelli, and Fausto Bertinotti) and of the CdL (Silvio 
Berlusconi, Gianfranco Fini, Pierferdinando Casini, and Umberto Bossi). 
The tests were divided into five blocks of trials, as shown schematically in Table 2. 
Participants were asked to classify the names of the main parties belonging to the left-wing 
coalition and to the right-wing coalition, or of their main leaders, on the one hand, and four 
pleasant (caress, rainbow, love, and happy) and four unpleasant (rotten, death, vomit, and 
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stink) words on the other hand. Blocks number 1, 2, and 4 were practice blocks, aimed at 
helping participants learn the association between the computer keys and the answer 
categories. Blocks 3 and 5 were the critical ones: We used the performance in these blocks to 
infer our participants’ implicit political attitude.  
As suggested by Greenwald et al. (1998), we built two versions of the “Parties-IAT” 
and two versions of the “Leaders-IAT”. In the version we labeled “Left-wing pleasant”, in 
the third block the left-wing objects (parties or leaders) were associated to pleasant words 
and the right-wing objects (parties or leaders) were associated to unpleasant words, while in 
the fifth block we associated the right-wing objects (parties or leaders) to pleasant words and 
the left-wing objects (parties or leaders) to unpleasant words. On the contrary, in the   
“Right-wing positive” version, we associated the right-wing objects (parties or leaders) to 
pleasant words and the left-wing objects (parties or leaders) to unpleasant words in the third 
block, while in the fifth block the left-wing objects (parties or leaders) were associated to 
pleasant words and the right-wing objects (parties or leaders) were associated to unpleasant 
words. Thus, as a whole we built four versions of the IAT, combining two criteria: the nature 
of the test stimuli (“Parties-IAT” vs. “Leaders-IAT) and the order of presentation of the two 
critical blocks (“Left-wing positive” vs. “Right-wing positive”). The four versions of the test 
were randomly presented to our participants. As a whole, 1,231 people successfully 
completed the test. 
Based on performance of participants in the IAT, we computed the D index 
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), a weighted index that uses the information about the 
number of errors as well as the information about the mean latency characterizing the critical 
tasks. To compute D we took four steps: (a) we substituted the latency of each wrong 
categorization with the average latency of the critical block to which the wrong answer 
belonged, adding a 600 ms penalty; (b) we computed the average latency for each critical 
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block; (c) we computed the difference between the average latency of the two critical blocks; 
and (d) we divided such difference by the standard deviation of the latencies of the two 
critical blocks. We coded the D scores in a direction that was favorable to the Unione, the 
winner of the election. Thus, more positive scores were indicative of a higher preference for 
the Unione, as compared to the Cdl.3  
Besides the IAT, we used five other variables: (a) voting intention, expressed in the 
pre-electoral survey; we considered as reticent the participants who answered “I prefer not to 
answer this question”, and as undecided the participants who declared they have not chosen 
how to cast their vote; among the participants who expressed their voting intention, we coded 
0 the answers in favor of the right-wing coalition and 1 those in favor of the left-wing one; 
(b) a synthetic index expressing the explicit attitude toward the political leaders we used in 
the IAT, asked in the pre-electoral survey, computed as the difference between the mean 
judgment expressed on the left-wing leaders and the mean judgment expressed on the    
right-wing leaders; (c) the interaction between the explicit attitude and the IAT scores, 
computed after centering the two variables; (d) the post-electoral question asking participants 
to report when they took their decision on how to vote; and (e) voting behavior, asked in the 
post-electoral survey (we assigned 0 to the participants who declared they voted for the  
right-wing coalition and 1 for those who declared they voted for the left-wing one). Table 3 
shows the proportion of participants who got a valid score for the critical variables we 
considered. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses showed that the D scores did not vary as a function of the kind of 
test stimuli (“Parties-IAT” vs. “Leaders-IAT”), t(1229) = .631, p = .528, 2 = .000. Thus, in 
                                                 
3 We performed parallel analyses using, instead of D, the index proposed by Greenwald et al. (1998), which 
takes into account the latency of the responses only. The results we obtained, available upon request, were 
almost identical to those we present. 
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the presentation of the results we will not take this design variable into consideration. 
However, we detected a slight effect of the order of presentation of the critical blocks  
(“Left-wing positive”: M = .09, SD = .68; “Right-wing positive”: M = -.03, SD = .71), 
t(1229) = 3.071, p < .01. This effect was negligible from the substantive point of view, 2 = 
.006, and was significant because of the unusual sample size: Basically, it was shown that the 
effect of order on the D index was very modest. Nevertheless, we decided to take this order 
effect order into account in most of the subsequent analyses. Therefore, we computed a new 
D, taking three steps. First, we divided our sample into two sub-samples, based on the order 
of presentation of the critical blocks. Second, we standardized D in each of the sub-samples. 
Third, we merged the two Ds thus obtained to compute a new D, free from the effect of the 
design variables. We labeled zD such new index.4 
Did the IAT Significantly Correlate with Our Participants’ Voting Behavior? 
In order to pursue our general goal, we analyzed the point-biserial correlation between 
the IAT and the content of our participants’ voting behavior. As shown in Table 4, consistent 
with our HP1, such correlation was strong. However, both in our whole sample and in our 
subsamples composed of the participants who actually cast a valid vote, the judgments  
and—above all—voting intention showed much stronger correlations with voting behavior 
than the IAT.  
Was the IAT an Effective Predictor of the Election Results? 
To pursue our first specific goal, we performed an unusual “post-hoc prediction” of 
the results of the 2006 Italian National Election, comparing the forecasts we could make 
using voting intention, explicit attitude, and implicit attitude with the official outcome of the 
political competition. To perform such analysis, as two coalitions were competing, we had to 
                                                 
4 Besides zD we computed two more Ds free from the effect exerted by the design variable. First, we took the 
same steps of the strategy we chose, but we centered, instead of standardizing, D. Second, we saved the 
residuals of a simple linear regression in which we used D as the dependent variable and our design dummy 
variable as the independent variable. The results we obtained, available upon request, were almost identical to 
those we present. 
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dichotomize the IAT scores and our synthetic index assessing participants’ explicit attitude. 
Thus, in both cases an important assumption was necessary: to take a zero-point value, i.e. a 
value over which we assumed that the respondent preferred the left-wing coalition, and under 
which the right-wing one (for a discussion of this assumption see Blanton & Jaccard, 2006; 
Greenwald, Nosek, & Sriram, 2006).  
IAT scores are relative scores of automatic preference for one of the two concepts; 
therefore, given the negligible effect of order on the scores and given that all prevalent 
parties/leaders were presented in the task, we assumed that the score zero represented 
absence of preference for the objects of the test, whereas positive scores represented implicit 
preference for Unione and negative scores represented implicit preference for the CdL. 
Therefore we dichotomized the IAT, counterposing respondents showing pro-left (above 0) 
vs. pro-right (below 0) scores. As concerns explicit judgments, it was reasonable to assume 
that participants gave the same meaning to the scale when they were evaluating the left-wing 
and the right-wing leaders. Like in the case of the IAT, we dichotomized this variable 
considering the respondents who in the interview expressed more favorable evaluations of 
the left-wing leaders (above 0 scorers) as explicitly preferring the Unione; on the contrary, 
we considered the participants who expressed more favorable evaluations for the right-wing 
leaders (below 0 scorers) as explicitly preferring the CdL.  
Table 5 shows the comparison between the official results of the Italian 2006 National 
Election and the forecasts of such results we could make using voting intention, explicit 
attitudes towards the main Italian political leaders, and the IAT. As concerns the Election’s 
official result, in the Table we present the valid votes for the two coalitions only, without 
taking into consideration the small parties which did not converge into one of the two 
coalitions (0.3% of the valid votes) and the quota of voters which did not express a valid vote 
(16.4% of the whole constituency). The same holds true as concerns our forecasts based on 
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voting intention, the explicit, and the implicit attitudes, which were respectively based on the 
60.1%, the 87.8%, and on the 89.4% of our participants. The last row of the Table presents, 
for each of our prediction, the poll’s A index (Martin, Traugott, & Kennedy, 2005).5  
Generally speaking, the accuracy of our forecasts based on voting intention, explicit 
attitudes, and the IAT were similar to the average accuracy of the 73 published pre-election 
polls performed to forecast the 2006 Italian National Election, which was A = .10 (Callegaro 
& Gasperoni, 2008). None of our three predictions was significantly biased in favor of the 
left- or of the right-wing coalition, with p < .05. However, as often happens when using A, 
the non-significativity of our As could have depended on the relatively small Ns of our polls 
more than on their accuracy (Callegaro & Gasperoni, 2008). Thus, we qualitatively analyzed 
the performances of the three polls, without taking into consideration the non-significativity 
of their distortion. As a whole, the IAT and voting intention were the two variables which 
best approximated the official results, without much difference between them, even if with 
the IAT 11.5% of the participants were unclassifiable because of their performance, while 
using voting intention nearly 40% of the sample was unclassifiable, because this high 
percentage could not or did not want to express a voting intention. Had we used the explicit 
judgments we could classify more than 96% of respondents; however, the prediction we 
could make would have been rather unsatisfactory. In conclusion predictions based on the 
IAT were substantially analogous to those based on voting intention and not worse (and, if 
                                                 
5 A is a measure of the predictive accuracy (A) of an election poll which allows to examine both the poll’s 
accuracy and its bias. A is computed as the natural log of the odds ratio of the results of the poll and of the 
Election, using the formula A = ln[(l/r)/(L/R)], where l and r are the number (or the percentage) of the poll’s 
respondents respectively in favor of the left- and for the right-wing coalition, while L and R are the number (or 
the percentage) of voters who respectively voted for the left- or the right-wing coalition. It is possible to 
compute its variance, using the formula Variance(A) =  1/(n*l*r), where n is the number or respondents in favor 
of the left- or of the right-wing coalition, l is the proportion of respondents in favor of the left-wing coalition, 
and r is the proportion of respondents in favor of the right-wing coalition, with l + r = 1. Based on A’s variance, 
it is possible to compute A’s standard error, and thus the significance of the deviation of A from 0 by 
constructing a confidence interval around 0, which is A’s expected value in the absence of bias. If A’s estimate 
will fall within such interval the poll will be considered as not significantly biased. A significantly above 0 A 
would show the poll to be biased in favor of the left-wing coalition, while a significantly below 0 A would show 
the poll to be biased in favor of the right-wing coalition. For the statistical details, see Martin et al. (2005). 
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anything, slightly closer to the observed electoral result) as compared to the predictions 
based on explicit attitudes; moreover, they were probably more stable than those based on 
voting intention, being based on a larger quota of respondents. 
Was the IAT an Effective Predictor of Individual Voting Behavior? 
In order to pursue our second specific goal, we compared the dissociative, the additive, 
and the interactive models performing a hierarchic logistic regression aimed at predicting the 
content of our participants’ voting behavior using voting intention at step 1 and adding 
explicit attitude at step 2. At step 3 we added the IAT, making our HP2a and HP2b compete: 
The data would have been consistent with the dissociative model and with our HP2a if the 
IAT wouldn’t have added predictive power to the model. On the contrary, they would have 
been consistent with the additive model and with our HP2b if the IAT would have added 
predictive power to the model. Finally, we added the interaction between explicit and 
implicit attitude at step 4. The data would have been consistent with our HP3 if inconsistency 
between explicit and implicit attitude would have exerted no influence on the content of the 
vote cast by our participants. As we wanted to work on the whole sample, we recoded voting 
intention into three dummies, respectively assessing: (a) expressing vs. not expressing a 
voting intention in favor of the left-wing coalition; (b) expressing vs. not expressing a voting 
intention in favor of the right-wing coalition; and (c) being vs. not being a reticent participant 
(i.e. a respondent who did not want to express his/her voting intention). We used being vs. 
not being an undecided participant (i.e. a respondent who could not express his/her voting 
intention) as reference category.  
Table 6 shows that in all of our steps the voting intentions in favor of the left and of the 
right were the most effective predictors of the vote. Adding at step 2 the explicit attitudes 
significantly improved the fit of the model. Consistent with the additive model (HP2b), and 
contrary to the dissociative model (HP2a), the same held true when we added the IAT at step 
Predicting the vote       19
3, even if the significance of the improvement was rather low. Finally, consistent with our 
HP3, the interaction between explicit and implicit attitudes, which measured their 
consistency, did not significantly influence our dependent variable. 
Next, we performed three hierarchic logistic regressions analyzing the influence 
exerted by consistency between explicit and implicit attitudes on three dependent variables: 
(a) the dummy expressing being (= 1) vs. not being (= 0) an undecided participant in the  
pre-electoral survey; (b) the moment in which our participants decided how to behave on 
Election Day (we assigned the code 0 to participants who decided how to behave on Election 
Day at least 7 days before the Election, and the code 1 to participants who took their decision 
about how to behave less than 7 days before the Election Day; thus, the dependent variable 
expressed a delayed decision); and (c) the probability of actually casting a vote (we assigned 
the code 0 to participants who did not vote, and code 1 to those who actually voted).6 
Table 7 shows the results of the first analysis. Consistent with our HP4, neither explicit 
nor implicit attitudes influenced the probability of being an undecided participant, while a 
positive interaction between the two attitudes negatively influenced it. In other words, those 
who where characterized by congruence between implicit and explicit attitudes had a higher 
probability to have already made up an intention when they participated in the pre-electoral 
interview. 
Substantially consistent with HP5, undecided respondents took a longer time to make 
up their choice when their explicit and implicit attitudes were inconsistent. Indeed, Table 8 
shows that the criterion of taking a decision more or less than 7 days before the election was 
not related to explicit and implicit attitudes taken separately, but a marginal interaction 
between explicit and implicit attitudes emerged (p = .059), which indicated that the higher 
                                                 
6 In these regressions we did not enter voting intention among our predictors, as we were interested in analyzing 
the effect exerted by the interplay of explicit and implicit attitudes on the probability of actually casting a vote 
(any vote) and and not on the probability of casting a vote in favor of a specific coalition. However, parallel 
analyses performed entering voting intention also brought to substantially analogous results. Their results are 
available upon request. 
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the inconsistency, the higher the probability of the decision being taken nearer to the election 
day.  
Finally, Table 9 shows that in the logistic regression with voting vs. abstaining as 
criterion, exactly the same pattern of results emerged, indicating a higher probability of 
abstention in those showing inconsistent explicit and implicit attitudes. Contrary to HP6, 
however, this pattern was not significant (p = .290). Given the numerosity of the undecided 
sub-sample (n = 362) this result was hardly related to a lack of power of the analysis. Hence, 
as a whole, the hypothesis of a synergistic effect of the congruence between explicit and 
implicit attitudes on the process of decision making found only partial support. Results from 
the first and from the second logistic regressions indicated that the process of decision 
making was deferred by undecided participants with incongruent attitudes, but results from 
the third logistic regression suggested that the incongruence caused only a delay, not a 
refraining from the decision. 
Discussion 
The IAT is one of the most fascinating research instruments developed by social 
cognitive researchers during the last decade. During its first eleven years of life, it proved to 
be robust (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007), versatile, and valid (Greenwald et al., 2008) 
and was widely used in research. Due to its remarkable characteristics, it might be of interest 
in many fields of applied psychology as well. In the present paper, we investigated its 
usefulness in electoral forecasts. This issue was decomposed into three related questions. 
First, can the IAT enhance the quality of the forecasts made by pollsters in pre-electoral 
research? Second, does it add incremental validity to the predictions of the elections results? 
And third, what is the interplay between implicit and explicit attitudes in influencing voting 
behavior? A fourth, more general, question concerned the validity of the IAT when it is taken 
out of the laboratory and administered face-to face in a field research, on a representative 
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sample of the population—i.e. on a sample which is much less educated than those usually 
analyzed in psychological research.  
We aimed to answer these questions by analyzing a wide, representative sample of the 
Italian population. We were able to perform our analyses due to the availability of a large 
grant given to Itanes by the Italian University Ministry, which made a large-scale 
administration of the IAT possible. The fact that—contrary to most of the pre-electoral 
polls—the left-wing coalition won the election with a very narrow margin made our research 
even more intriguing.  
Let us start from our general question. Like those obtained in previous research 
performed on convenience samples (Arcuri et al., 2008; Friese, Bluemke, & Wänke, 2007; 
Knutson et al., 2006; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), our results showed the existence 
of a significant, consistent relation between the IAT and the voting behavior of the people 
who declared their voting intention before the election, and—more interestingly—that of the 
people who did not express a voting intention before the election (either because reticent or 
undecided). It was the first time that the IAT’s external validity was evidenced in a 
representative sample, face-to face inteviewed. However, the relations between voting 
behavior on the one hand and voting intention and explicit political attitudes on the other 
hand were much stronger than those linking the IAT and voting behavior. 
To answer our first specific question, we compared the predictive power of the IAT 
scores and those of two much easier-to-assess variables: the voting intention and the explicit 
judgments expressed on the main leaders of the two coalitions who competed in the 2006 
Italian National Election. Our data showed that none of the three polls we could use to 
forecast the Election’s result was significantly biased in favor of the left- or of the right-wing 
coalition. However, their performances were not qualitatively equal: The voting intention 
and the IAT had nearly the same predictive power of the Election official results, and they 
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were much more effective than explicit attitudes on the main Italian political leaders. This 
result suggests to researchers interested in predicting the results of National Elections that at 
present it is more advisable to explore the participants’ voting intention, than to use the  
time- and resource-consuming IAT to gather their implicit attitudes.  
However, our research moved one step further, analyzing the interplay between explicit 
and implicit attitudes in influencing actual voting behavior. On the one hand, as concerns the 
content of the voting behavior, we showed that the IAT added a significant, though modest, 
incremental predictive power to the explicit attitudes, so far our results supported the 
additive model of prediction of political behavior. On the other hand, contrary to the 
interaction model—even if it significantly predicted the probability of being undecided in the 
pre-electoral survey and that of delaying the decision to the last possible                 
moment—consistency between implicit and explicit political attitudes did not significantly 
predict the probability of of casting a valid vote. Hence, the hypothesis of a synergistic effect 
of the congruence between explicit and implicit attitudes on the process of decision making 
found only partial support: Information on the interplay between explicit and implicit 
attitudes did not help to predict whether the individual actually cast their vote or did not 
(even though it helped predictig when the decision was eventually taken).  
Thus, as a whole, we could not effectively link consistency between explicit and 
implicit attitudes (measured in the pre-electoral poll) and the decision to cast vs. not to cast a 
vote (measured in the post-electoral poll). However, we feel we should not discard the 
interaction model yet. Indeed, our data did not allow us to analyze what happened, in our 
undecided participants’ mind, between the pre- and the post-electoral poll. Lau and 
Redlawsk (1997, 2001) recently developed the dynamic information board, a technique 
which, simulating a real-world election campaign, traces participants’ political          
decision-making processes while they happen. Using such a research tool, Redlawsk (2004) 
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showed that voters adopt different strategies of political decision-making, dependent on the 
campaign environment (mainly in terms of richness of the information environment) and on 
their individual characteristics (mainly in terms of motivation and cognitive ability). It is 
plausible that the relation between the explicit*implicit attitudes interaction and the final 
decision of casting vs. not casting a vote could depend on the decision making strategy used 
by participants. Among them, the distinction between compensatory (i.e. systematic) and 
noncompensatory (i.e. non systematic) strategies seems plausibly relevant. Our data did not 
allow us to analyze the strategy our participants used to take their voting decision. Thus, 
before closing the book on the interactive model, research based on the integration of such 
literature with that on the interplay between explicit and implicit attitudes would be 
welcome. 
One could argue that our research had three limits. First, when comparing the 
predictive validity of two measures, it is often advisable to counterbalance the order of their 
administration, to control for the possible influences of one variable on the other. For 
practical reasons, in the present study participants first took part in a long interview, devoted 
to analyzing a number of social attitudes and political opinions and then, after declaring their 
voting intention, they performed the IAT. Hence, the order of presentation of the explicit and 
the implicit political measures was not counterbalanced. Would the results have been 
different, if the other order of administration (i.e., IAT first, followed by the interview) had 
been used? In other words, might the in-depth interview have diminished the predictive value 
of the IAT? 
Recent research into the malleability of attitudes and implicit beliefs (Blair, 2002; 
Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) suggests that the expression of implicit associations could 
be influenced by previously activated cognitive processes and by the context. On the one 
hand, one could argue that the questions asked by the interviewers, prompting the activation 
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of one’s knowledge structures when expressing one’s implicit attitudes, positively influenced 
the strength of the relation between the IAT scores and the voting behavior. However, on the 
other hand one could argue that the traditional interview which preceded the IAT touched on 
a number of aspects of the cognitive representation of politics which were irrelevant both for 
the subsequent expression of implicit political attitudes and for the subsequent electoral 
choice. Thus, the traditional interview could have negatively influenced the predictive 
validity of the voting behavior shown by the IAT. 
Nonetheless, recent research has shown that the order of presentation of the explicit and 
the implicit tasks exerts minimal or even null influences on the IAT scores (see Egloff & 
Schmukle, 2002, Study 2; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmidt, 2005; Nosek 
et al., 2005). Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2007) concluded that “a reasonable procedural 
guideline is to counterbalance order of IAT and self-report measures in the absence of 
reasons for just using a single order” (p. 273). However, in our opinion the research cited 
above and the strength and the consistency of our data made it plausible that even by using 
this strategy one would obtain results similar to ours. As a matter of fact, in a replication of 
our research recently performed on a small Italian sample (N = 50) taking this design 
variable into consideration, the order of presentation of the explicit and the implicit tasks did 
not significantly influence D (Borra, 2008). 
The second limit of our research was that we presented our participants the IAT using a 
non-standard administration procedure, introducing the pleasant-unpleasant dichotomy 
instead of that counterposing the left- and the right-wing objects in the first blocks of trials. 
Moreover, in order to keep the “right wing” and “left-wing” meaning of the coalitions 
congruent with response mode to avoid incongruences in response mode (which would have 
been caused by the request to classify “right-wing” stimuli pressing the left key, and vice 
versa) we switched the sides of the valence concepts in the fourth step of the test, when 
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usually the target concepts are switched at that point. These inversions may have determined 
the very slight order effects we detected. According to Tony Greenwald, who                   
non-anonimously reviewed the first version of this article, our procedure likely perturbed 
results no more than mildly, and the correction we used for order effects was appropriate. As 
a matter of fact, a replication of our research, performed on a small Italian sample (N = 41) 
comparing the standard IAT procedure and that we used, showed that this design variable did 
not significantly influence D (Pittarello, 2008). 
Moreover, in our analyses we used our participants’ self reports on the vote they casted 
as dependent variable, even if research shows that such self-reports may be untrue of the 
actual voting intention and vote cast, mainly because some participants who feel to hold a 
minoritarian position prefer to give insincere answers, aimed at making them appear as part 
of the majority (Noelle-Neumann, 1993). However, we believe that this problem was not 
particularly serious, as the left-wing and the right-wing coalitions got nearly the same 
percentage of votes. Indeed, politological research shows that distortions of post-electoral 
self-reports on one’s own vote are particularly relevant when a party or a coalition easily 
won the Election, while participants do not show strong tendency to lie in post-electoral 
surveys if elections end with a tie (Wright, 1993). Nonetheless, we cannot argue that no 
distortion at all was at work. This a typical, inevitable limit of all the research performed 
trying to predict self-reported behaviors (Schwartz, 1999). 
Another factor possibly distorting our results was that voting intention, explicit attitude, 
and voting behavior were all measured through self-report, while the IAT is an implicit 
measure based on automatic processes. Thus, this method commonality might have inflated 
the apparent predictive validity of pre-election self-report measures, and not that of the IAT. 
However, the results we obtained were pretty consistent both when using as criterion the 
Election official outcome—which was, by definition, not flawed by this                      
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possible distortion—and our participants’ self-reported voting behavior. Nonetheless, since 
in the political context it is not possible to directly observe and measure individual behaviors, 
replications of our research performed in other contexts of deliberate choice, in which the 
individual behavior may be directly observed, will be obviously welcome. 
To conclude, the present work provided substantial external validity to the IAT for the 
measurement of political attitudes. We could show that it has predictive validity and a 
modest incremental validity in the prediction of voting behavior in a large and representative 
sample of voters, supporting the additive model of prediction of behavior. However, our 
results showed we should not suggest pollster to use it to forecast electoral results, as the 
ratio between its costs and its benefits is far from satisfactory. Moreover, we could show that 
the simultaneous use of implicit and explicit measures can help shed light on the process of 
political decision making. In particular, from the present data it emerged that the interplay 
between implicit and explicit political attitudes can delay (when inconsistent) or facilitate 
(when consistent) the decision; importantly, however, the present data suggested that the 
final behavior (i.e., going to the ballot vs. abstaining from the vote, and the content of the 
casted ballot) is not influenced by the interplay between implicit and explicit political 
preferences. 
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Table I. 
 
Research Hypotheses 
 
Number of the 
hypothesis 
Content of the hypothesis 
HP1 The IAT significantly correlates with participants’ voting behavior 
HP2a The IAT does not add predictive power to models predicting voting 
behavior using explicit attitudes 
HP2b The IAT does adds predictive power to models predicting voting behavior 
using explicit attitudes 
HP3 The interaction between the IAT and the explicit attitudes does not 
influence the content of the voting behavior 
HP4 Consistency between the IAT and the explicit attitudes fosters the 
probability of having made up one’s decision about how to vote in the   
pre-electoral survey, while voting intention and explicit attitudes do not 
HP5 Among undecided voters, consistency between the IAT and the explicit 
attitudes fosters the probability of actually voting, while explicit attitudes 
do not 
HP6 Among undecided voters, consistency between the IAT and the explicit 
attitudes fosters the probability of a fast decision about how to vote, while 
explicit attitudes do not 
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Table II. 
 
IAT Block Sequence 
 
Block Instructions Stimuli associated to the “E” key Stimuli associated to the “I” 
key 
Number 
of trials 
1. Practice block: valence of 
the words 
Press the “E” key for pleasant words and 
the “I” key for unpleasant words 
Pleasant words (caress, rainbow, 
love, happy) 
Unpleasant words (rotten, 
death, vomit, stink) 
24 
2. Practice block: parties Press the “E” key for left-wing parties and 
the “I” key for right-wing parties 
Left-wing parties (Rifondazione 
comunista, Democratici di sinistra, 
Margherita, Verdi) 
Right-wing parties (Forza 
Italia, Alleanza nazionale, 
Lega Nord, UDC) 
24 
3. Critical block: association 
between left-wing parties 
and pleasant words 
Press the “E” key for left-wing parties and 
for pleasant words; press the “I” key for 
right-wing parties and for unpleasant words 
Left-wing parties and pleasant 
words (e.g. Rifondazione 
comunista, caress) 
Right-wing parties and 
unpleasant words (e.g. 
Forza Italia, rotten) 
60 
4. Practice block: valence of 
the words 
Press the “E” key for unpleasant words and 
the “I” key for pleasant words (i.e. answers 
keyed contrary to block 1) 
Unpleasant words (rotten, death, 
vomit, stink) 
Pleasant words (caress, 
rainbow, love, happy) 
48 
5. Critical block: association Press the “E” key for left-wing parties and Left-wing parties and unpleasant Right-wing parties and 60 
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between right-wing parties 
and pleasant words 
for unpleasant words; press the “I” key for 
right-wing parties and for pleasant words 
words (e.g. Rifondazione 
comunista, rotten) 
pleasant words (e.g. Forza 
Italia, caress) 
Note. The order of the practice blocks and of the critical tasks was counterbalanced among participants, as fully described in the text. In the table we present 
the “Parties-IAT” in the “Left-wing positive” version. 
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Table III. 
 
Proportion of Valid Cases in the Critical Variables 
 
Variable Frequency of 
valid cases 
Percentage of valid cases 
Voting intention 831 60.1 
Explicit attitude 1,225 87.8 
Implicit attitude 1,244 89.4 
Voting behavior 1,078 76.8 
Time of decision about how to vote 1,237 89.8 
Total 1,377 100.0 
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Table IV. 
 
Correlations between Voting Behavior, Voting Intention, Implicit Attitude, and Explicit Attitude 
 
 1 2 3 4 
All participants who voted 
1. Voting behavior  = 1.00 
N = 1,057 
 = .93***
N = 743 
rpb = .51***
N = 952 
rpb = .84***
N = 984 
2. Voting intention   = 1.00 
N = 827 
rpb = .56***
N = 763 
rpb = .82***
N = 780 
3. Implicit attitude   r = 1.00 
N = 1,219 
r = .50*** 
N = 1,085 
4. Explicit attitude    r = 1.00 
N = 1,208 
Participants who voted and expressed their voting intention 
1. Voting behavior r = 1.00 
N = 743 
= .93***
N = 743 
rpb = .56***
N = 686 
rpb = .87***
N = 713 
2. Voting intention  = 1.00 
N = 827 
rpb = .56***
N = 763 
rpb = .82***
N = 780 
3. Implicit attitude   r = 1.00 
N = 763 
r = .54*** 
N = 723 
4. Explicit attitude    r = 1.00 
N = 780 
Reticent participants 
1. Voting behavior  = 1.00 
N = 81 
 rpb =  .53***
N = 73 
rpb =.84***
N = 70 
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3. Implicit attitude   r = 1.00 
N = 121 
r = .47*** 
N = 104 
4. Explicit attitude    r = 1.00 
N = 111 
Undecided participants 
1. Voting behavior  = 1.00 
N = 234 
 rpb = .29***
N = 193 
rpb = .75***
N = 200 
3. Implicit attitude   r = 1.00 
N = 334 
r = .31*** 
N = 258 
4. Explicit attitude    r = 1.00 
N = 317 
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Table V. 
Post-hoc prediction of the results of the 2006 Italian National Election 
 
 Official 
result 
Prediction using 
voting intention 
Prediction using 
explicit attitude 
Prediction using 
the IAT 
Cdl (right-wing 
coalition) 
49.9% 51.5% 46.0% 48.8% 
Unione (left-wing 
coalition) 
50.1% 48.5% 54.0% 51.2% 
A  -.06 .16 .05 
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Table VI. 
 
Efficiency of the Variables Used to Predict the Content of the Vote Cast  
 
 Step 1 
(voting intention only) 
Step 2 
(Model 1 + explicit 
attitude) 
Step 3 
(Model 2 + Iat) 
Step 4 
(Model 3 + consistency between 
explicit attitude and the IAT) 
 B E.S. Exp(B) B E.S. Exp(B) B E.S. Exp(B) B E.S. Exp(B) 
Voting intention for the 
Unione 
4.012*** .057 55.264 2.802*** .605 16.482 2.867*** .695 17.579 2.829*** .695 16.924 
Voting intention for the CdL -2.873*** .285 .057 -.753 .467 .470 -.458 .481 .633 -.441 .482 .643 
Reticence .596 .305 1.815 .192 .627 1.212 .316 .660 1.372 .290 .662 1.373 
Explicit attitude    1.578*** .174 4.844 1.569*** .179 4.802 1.610*** .194 5.003 
Implicit attitude       .609* .259 1.839 .739* .312 2.094 
Interaction between explicit 
and implicit attitude  
         .166 .208 1.181 
Constant .162 .155 1.175 .053 .292 1.054 .065 .296 1.067 .093 .303 1.097 
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Cox & Snell’s pseudo’s R2 .549 .690 .692 .692 
Nagelkerke’s pseudo’s R2 .737 .926 .929 .929 
Percentage of correctly 
classified cases 
86.3 96.1 96.2 96.0 
Improvement of the fit of 
the model 
 (2(1)) = 336.749, p < 
.001 
(2(1)) = 5.853, p < .05 (2(1)) = .645, ns 
Note. * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
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Table VII. 
 
Efficiency of the Variables Used to Predict Whether Participants Were Undecided in the Pre-
Electoral Survey 
 
 Step 1 
(Explicit attitude) 
Step 2 
(Step 1 + implicit 
attitude) 
Step 3 
(Step 2 + consistency 
between explicit and 
impliciti attitude) 
 B E.S. Exp(B) B E.S. Exp(B) B E.S. Exp(B)
Explicit 
attitude 
-.016 .019 .984 -.022 .022 .975 -.030 .022 .971 
Implicit 
attitude 
   .039 .081 .635 .022 .084 1.022 
Interaction 
between 
explicit and 
implicit 
attitude 
      -
.132*** 
.023 .876 
Constant -
1.160***
.072 .314 -
1.158***
.072 .314 .963*** .077 .382 
Cox & 
Snell’s 
pseudo’s R2 
.001 .001 .036 
Nagelkerke’s .001 .001 .054 
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pseudo’s R2 
Percentage 
of correctly 
classified 
cases 
76.2 76.2 75.8 
Improvement 
of the fit of 
the model 
 (2(1)) = .225, ns (2(1)) = 38.587, p < 
.001 
Note. *** p < .001. 
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Table VIII. 
 
Efficiency of the Variables Used to Predict When Participants Decided How to Behave on Election 
Day 
 
 Step 1 
(Explicit attitude) 
Step 2 
(Step 1 + implicit 
attitude) 
Step 3 
(Step 2 + consistency 
between explicit and 
implicit attitude) 
 B E.S. Exp(B) B E.S. Exp(B) B E.S. Exp(B) 
Explicit attitude -.008 .053 .992 -.017 .055 .984 -.030 .057 .970 
Implicit attitude    .094 .178 1.098 .017 .184 1.017 
Interaction 
between explicit 
and implicit 
attitude 
      -.124† .066 .884 
Constant -
.840*** 
.147 .432 -
.836***
.146 .433 -.771*** .151 .463 
Cox & Snell’s 
pseudo’s R2 
.000 .001 .018 
Nagelkerke’s 
pseudo’s R2 
.000 .002 .126 
Percentage of 
correctly 
classified cases 
69.9 69.9 70.1 
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Improvement of 
the fit of the 
model 
 (2(1)) = .277, ns (2(1)) = 3.785, p = .052 
Note. Analysis performed among undecided participants only. *** p < .001. † p < .10. 
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Table IX. 
 
Efficiency of the Variables Used to Predict if Participants Actually Voted 
 
 Step 1 
(Explicit attitude) 
Step 2 
(Step 1 + implicit 
attitude) 
Step 3 
(Step 2 + consistency 
between explicit and 
implicit attitude) 
 B E.S. Exp(B) B E.S. Exp(B) B E.S. Exp(B)
Explicit 
attitude 
-.011 .049 .989 -.008 .051 .992 -.007 .052 .993 
Iat    -.034 .159 .966 -.019 .161 .904 
Interaction 
between 
explicit 
attitude and 
the IAT 
      .055 .052 1.057 
Constant .625*** .131 1.869 .625*** .132 1.868 .589*** .135 1.802 
Cox & 
Snell’s 
pseudo’s R2 
.000 .000 .005 
Nagelkerke’s 
pseudo’s R2 
.000 .001 .007 
Percentage 
of correctly 
65.1 65.1 64.9 
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classified 
cases 
Improvement 
of the fit of 
the model 
 (2(1)) = .047, ns (2(1)) = 1.163, ns 
Note. Analysis performed among undecided participants only. *** p < .001. 
 
